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Abstract 
 
The Russian Federation is subject to a high degree of terrorist activity because the instability of the 
North Caucasus region makes it a breeding ground for terrorism. The main contemporary threat to 
the Russian Federation is terrorism linked to the North Caucasus. This thesis is based on Russian 
counter-terrorism policy in relation to public perceptions of the September 2004 tragedy of Beslan 
(North Ossetia). In September 2004, a school in Beslan was seized for three days by North Caucasian 
terrorists which resulted in a massacre with an extremely high number of hostages (1300), fatalities 
(372) and injuries (747). The Beslan tragedy is considered to be the Russian 9/11 and could, due to its 
magnitude and impact, theoretically be a turning point in counter-terrorism policy and public 
perceptions in the Russian Federation. However, the Beslan event has not been a significant turning 
point in Russian counter-terrorism legislation and laws, despite certain changes and amendments. 
Furthermore, despite relatively small reforms in the security services, these reforms have been 
considered to be primarily cosmetic and have not yielded significant results. Also, the perceptions of 
terrorism and the government’s efforts to combat terrorism among Russian citizens have not 
improved since Beslan. The rhetoric by the media and government seems to focus primarily on the 
ostensible success of its counter-terrorism approach. However, despite the qualification of Beslan as 
the Russian 9/11 and the changes in policy following the event, terrorist activity remains a serious 
part of daily life within the Russian Federation and any potential improvements in the near future are 
considered to be unlikely.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“This abhorrent and calculated action by an armed group on a school displays a callous 
disregard for civilian life, it is an attack on the most fundamental right - the right to life; our 
organizations denounce this act unreservedly.”  
               (Amnesty International, 2008) 
 
“The terrorists who seized the school in Beslan also said that their families had died, their 
loved ones killed and that is why they had come to kill. But this is a vicious circle that has to 
be broken […] The law is above everything. If only the law had worked, then what happened 
to Kaloyev1 and to us would not have occurred.”  
               (Ella Kesayeva, Voice of Beslan, 2008) 
 
The first quote above represents a joint NGO statement published by Amnesty International in 2008 
regarding Beslan. Several worldwide respected NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch, International 
Federation of Human Rights, International League for Human Rights and the All-Russia Movement for 
Human Rights agreed upon the statement. This quote marks the importance and impact of the 
terrorist act in Beslan. The second quote is derived from Ella Kesayeva –head of a North Ossetian 
pressure group that can be linked to the Mothers of Beslan– in which she clearly focuses on the 
inefficient laws that were in place at the time of the attack. She implies that the Russian government 
should be held responsible for casualties among allegedly innocent people in the North Caucasus 
who are seeking revenge. The combination of both quotes, the magnitude and impact of the Beslan 
event created a personal desire to study the Russian Federation’s counter-terrorism policy.          
 The specific purpose of this thesis is to analyze, using a two-pronged approach, any changes 
in the Russian counter-terrorism [1] policies and [2] public perceptions in the aftermath of the 2004 
tragedy in Beslan. This thesis aims to answer the following research question: was Beslan a turning 
point in Russia's approach to counter-terrorism? In a broad sense, the counter-terrorism policy refers 
to legislation, laws and reforms in Russian security departments, while public perceptions refers to 
the Russian citizens, the role of the media and its accompanying rhetoric in the creation of public 
                                                             
1
 Vitaly Kaloyev – an architect from North Ossetia  – is used as an example by Kesayeva of someone who lost his family due 
to an air crash in Switzerland and who blamed the traffic controller and the failing authorities. Kaloyev took matters into his 
own hands and took revenge on the traffic controller by stabbing him to death. He is therefore seen as a hero in his home 
country of North Ossetia.      
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perceptions of terrorism as well as actual facts and figures about terrorist incidents and victims. 
These two approaches will serve as the underlying foundation and framework of this research.  
 Answering the research question is difficult because the extent to which counter-terrorism is 
successful is determined by the rhetoric of both the Russian media and the government regardless of 
reality and the perceptions of Russian citizens. In other words, it does not matter whether counter-
terrorism policies have actually changed or improved as long as the public thinks that they have. 
Obviously, this control of perception has been achieved through the creation of vigorous and 
misleading rhetoric. Counter-terrorism policy prior to and after Beslan will be analyzed and 
compared in order to emphasize any changes, similarities and differences and whether they can be 
linked to Beslan. In doing so, one can determine whether Beslan sparked an actual turning point in 
regard to counter-terrorism policy in Russia. The primary focus of this thesis relates to the North 
Caucasus region. I acknowledge that terrorism is considered to be a nationwide phenomenon in 
Russia, however it is not within the scope of this thesis, to analyze terrorism nationwide. The North 
Caucasus is the region most subjected to terrorist activity in the Russian Federation, which explains 
the focus on this unstable and erratic region where the tragedy of Beslan occurred. 
 The Beslan tragedy is classified as a ‘hostage-taking tragedy’ and will serve as the central 
point of this thesis. Ten years ago, on 1 September 2004 at 9:20am, terrorists seized School No.1 in 
Beslan. What was to be a festive start of the new school year ended as a nightmare. The event of 
Beslan is branded as Russia’s 9/11 which further explains the importance of this event. This research 
was conducted during the 10 year anniversary of the Beslan event, an important time to gauge 
Russia’s counter-terrorism policy in its aftermath. In order to put the alleged changes in legislation 
after Beslan into perspective, another prominent attack in the city of Nalchik, situated in the 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic (KBR) that followed in 2005, will briefly be analyzed.    
 It is important to bear in mind the context of terrorism within the Russian Federation. 
Therefore, this thesis covers more than just legislation, laws and security reforms. The role of the 
Russian media and its rhetoric and the Russian citizen’s general perception of (counter-) terrorism 
will be analyzed to provide a broader context. The historical setting, the origin and the reasons for 
terrorism will also be analyzed throughout this thesis. 
 This thesis ultimately aims to demonstrate that Beslan, despite its magnitude, has not been a 
major turning point in policy change. I argue that the changes in Russian counter-terrorism policy and 
perceptions of it in the aftermath of Beslan have been minimal and that terrorist activity continues 
on a large scale. Local authorities and the national government have failed to adapt policy based on 
previous attacks which reflects a dysfunctional power structure regarding the implementation of 
effective and successful counter-terrorism policy. Along with government dysfunction, misleading 
media also contributes to the lack of significant post-Beslan changes.  
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1.1 Statement of terrorism issue 
The term terrorism is generally complex and therefore difficult to define. As a result, the term has 
been continuously surrounded by controversies, debates and different perceptions and 
interpretations over centuries. There is no universally agreed upon definition but many in the field of 
terrorism, including scholars whom I reference in this thesis, such as Martin (2010), Simon (1994), 
Schmid & Jongman (1988), Merari (1993) and Laqueur (1987), have attempted to define terrorism. 
According to Martin, the term terrorism has hundreds of different definitions (Martin, 2010, p.41). In 
fact, other studies predicate even more than 200 definitions of the term terrorism which marks the 
complexity of the concept (Simon, 1994). Therefore, over a hundred official definitions have been 
collected and organized into four components in order of importance: [1] political goals, [2] causing 
fear and terror, [3] arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting, [4] the victimization of civilians, 
noncombatants, neutrals, or outsiders (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p.5).  
 One can also distinguish ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ terrorism. Russia is primarily 
concerned with domestic insurgency and terrorism. The term terrorism is also differentially 
interpreted worldwide but the definitions have common features that can be divided into the 
following categories: “state, dissident, religious, criminal and international terrorism” (Martin, 2010, 
p.46). Although some categories could very well intertwine, it is evident that every single country or 
region faces its own complexities and threats. Therefore, every country defines terrorism in its own 
way.  
 An official definition of counter-terrorism policy is non-existent due to the absence of an 
official universal definition of terrorism. This lack of definition complicates the process of establishing 
counter-terrorism policy (Setty, 2011, p.7). Despite the lack of an official definition of terrorism, 
Russia has managed to work around this absence and has, to a certain extent, created a counter-
terrorism policy that will be delineated throughout the thesis. It is very important to establish, for the 
specific purpose of this thesis, how the Russian Federation defines terrorism. Throughout this thesis, 
it will become clear how Russia defines the term terrorism and what its approach to combat 
terrorism is.   
 
1.2 Literature review 
In general, terrorism is a pressing issue within the Russian Federation and has its roots in Chechnya 
and the conflicts of the 1900s. In their book entitled National Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Orttung 
and Makarychev (2006) attempt to determine how terrorism affects the Russian Federation. They 
posit that “[1] Russian citizens and property are the targets of terrorism, [2] terrorism represents an 
obstacle to the peace process in the North Caucasus, [3] terrorism threatens the internal stability of 
Russia and finally, [4] terrorism endangers the spread of democratic norms and traditions in the 
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country” (Orttung & Makarychev, 2006, p.170).  The North Caucasus poses the largest problem to 
security so many scholars in the academic field of Russian counter-terrorism policy, write about 
Russia and the ongoing conflicts and unrest in the North Caucasus region. In his article Between 
Appeasement and Coercion: Russia 's Center- Periphery Relations from Yeltsin to Putin, Thumann 
points out that “the relationship between Russia and the south-periphery has always been difficult 
and complex due to multicultural diversity in the regions as well as rebellious minority peoples” 
(Thumann, 2001, p.193). The conflict between Russia and Chechnya dominated the 1990s and led to 
multiple bilateral wars and an ever-disturbed relationship. In his article entitled Nationalism and 
Islam in Russia’s North Caucasus, Zhemukhov attempts to explain the role of nationalism and Islam in 
the North Caucasus during the volatile 1990s as “an outgrowth of the eradication of religious and 
ethnic institutions by the Soviet regime. In the early years after the dissolution of the USSR, the 
ideology of nationalism became the primary ideology of the separatist groups situated in the North 
Caucasus” (Zhemukhov, 2013, p.2). Stepanova (2005) draws attention to the problems concerning 
the North Caucasus: “in all the problematic regions of Russia that have been torn by a combination of 
political, socio-economic, ethnic and religious problems and unrest, a peaceful solution has been 
found to major disagreements – in all, that is, except Chechnya” (Stepanova, 2005, p.303). It is 
therefore not surprising that the largest terrorist threat to Russia has roots in Chechnya. In fact, the 
majority of perpetrators at Beslan were Chechens.  
 Counter-terrorism policy and execution are perceived to be complex. In her article entitled 
From Dubrovka to Beslan: Who is learning faster?, Stepanova (2004) explains the complexity of 
counter-terrorism policy and the vast complexity of mass hostage crises. Further, she argues that “no 
country in the world seems to have a ready-made recipe for guaranteeing success in dealing with 
mass hostage crises” (Stepanova, 2004, p.1). The tragedy of Beslan reflects this lack of a ready-made 
recipe as, it eventually ended in a massacre.  
 Interestingly, the Russian Federation had already experienced numerous hostage crises prior 
to Beslan, namely in Budennovsk in 1995 (with more than 2,000 people held hostage), in Kizlyar 1996 
(over 2,000 hostages taken) and in Moscow in 2002 (over 800 hostages at the Dubrovka theatre), 
which suggests that the authorities lack the ability of learning from past crises.   
 Besides the issues concerning the North Caucasus, certain scholars and experts have written 
about counter-terrorism legislation and laws in Russia before and after Beslan. Counter-terrorism 
legislation and laws were already present in the 1990s. In her article Russia’s Counterterrorism Policy: 
Variations on an Imperial Theme, Omelicheva, Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas, 
claimed that “the 1998 law became the main pillar of counter-terrorism laws that were implemented 
in the 1990s” (Omelicheva, 2009, p.4). She furthermore argues that “president Putin pledged to 
overhaul the system of Russia’s security services and develop procedures for coordinating the 
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activities of counterterrorism agencies at the turn of the century” (Omelicheva, 2009, p.4). This was 
an interesting promise by the president in the light of Beslan and its aftermath. However, the 
changes of post-Beslan legislation and laws are considered to be minimal. The 2006 counter-
terrorism law is considered to be the most significant new counter-terrorism law, but is not sufficient 
to combat terrorism. So, despite this qualification, the article Russia Adopts New Counter-Terrorism 
Law, by Luchterhandt (2006), aims to demonstrate that this new law “does not correct the problems 
revealed by the Beslan crisis. Articles 7 and 8 of the presidential decree state that the organizational 
and leadership structures of counter-terrorist activities in the Northern Caucasus will be defined in 
the future by special regulations. It is not clear from the new law, however, what these regulations 
will be” (Luchterhandt, 2006, p.3). Omelicheva’s article After Beslan: Changes in Russia’s 
Counterterrorism Policy elaborates Luchterhandt’s ideas: “the legislation is silent about preventive or 
prophylactic measures of counteraction to terrorism. Russia’s counterterrorism policy retained its 
reactive and ‘catch-up’ characteristics with most of the measures adopted in response to terrorist 
incidents” (Omelicheva, 2012). Therefore, severe criticism has arisen against this law, as Nichol 
points out in his article Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus: 
Recent Developments that this new law permits “police and other security forces to declare a 
‘counter-terrorism operations regime’ in a locality and to detain suspects for up to 30 days, search 
homes, ban public assemblies, and restrict media activities without any pre-approval by the courts or 
legislative oversight” (Nichol, 2009, p.12-13). In addition, Omelicheva (2012) claimed that “the law 
has a negative effect on freedom of speech in Russia and the openness of debate concerning 
terrorism.” It seems that the 2006 law is controversial and not sufficient to combat terrorism.  
 However, it would be too simplistic and therefore a limitation to focus solely on laws and 
legislation. An important aspect of Russian counter-terrorism is the capability of the responsible 
authorities. In the article Russia in the Year 2003, Reddaway et al. (2004, p.4) suggest that “the 
siloviki appear—as a loose, bureaucracy-based faction—not to have a leader or leaders, not to meet 
in even a semi-public way, and not to have any means of coordinating their goals and plans.” Besides 
the ‘siloviki’ (former members of the Russian security and military services who were appointed as 
politicians during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin) in the Russian political system, 
the local authorities in the North Caucasus are the subject of criticism. Forster (2006), in his article 
Beslan: Counter-terrorism Incident Command: Lessons Learned claims that, following the events on 
Beslan and Nalchik, “the counter-terrorism policy conducted by the security services and local 
authorities proved to be,  poor and enhances the lack of a learning system after Beslan in terms of 
coordination, anticipation, prevention and discriminate assessment of the situation” (Forster, 2006, 
p.5). It is therefore also important to focus on authorities and not just policies.  
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 The Russian media seems to focus on the ostensible success of Russia’s approach to counter-
terrorism. In her publication Beslan School Tragedy: The Rhetoric of the Russian Media, Zaytseva 
(2005) explains how Russian newspapers “described Russian unity and support for President Putin as 
a goal that should be achieved at any cost. In some instances, the journalists’ arguments hardly 
followed any logical pattern and sounded like a magical incantation that was expected to bring 
positive results after numerous repetitions” (Zaytseva, 2005, p.43). Simons’ article The Use of 
Rhetoric and the Mass Media in Russia's War on Terror (2006), suggests that the media plays a 
significant role in terms of influencing public opinion as ‘one of the ‘problems’, which is by no means 
a problem solely confined to the present situation in Russia, but stems from the proximity of the 
mass media to society’s establishment’ (Simons, 2006, p.3).  Simons furthermore argues that the use 
of rhetoric has become harsher in the wake of Beslan namely ‘one of the frames that have emerged 
revolves around the slogan of “some people are unfit for talks”. In the wake of the Beslan attack, 
Putin was at a CIS conference in Astana (Kazakhstan), where he issued the comment “there are 
people with whom no talks can be held”, after which he made some links to other frames by 
mentioning Osama Bin Laden as being one such person and double standards in the War Against 
Terrorism’ (Simons, 2006, p.10). These former statements suggest that the use of violence by the 
Russian government towards terrorists was likely to increase. This can also be explained as bluster by 
the President to create a positive and strong image of its counter-terrorism policy towards the 
Russian citizens. 
 The literature suggests that the problem of terrorism within the Russian Federation is in 
practice even greater than expected. Russia’s counter-terrorism policy does not seem sufficient to 
effectively combat terrorism and improve in the near future. This is mainly exposed in the 
problemacy concerning the North Caucasus and the Russian government as a whole. In a broader 
context, there is limited information in the existing literature regarding the links between actual 
counter-terrorism policy and the role of the media and public perceptions of counter-terrorism. 
Legislation and laws, security reforms, the role of the media and the Russian public perception are 
analyzed only generally or evaluated in separate studies. Therefore, this thesis attempts to integrate 
the role of the media and public perception with legislation, laws and security reforms in order to 
place Russia’s counter-terrorism policy in a broader context and gain deeper insight into the problem 
of terrorism in Russia.  
  
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis is based on policy evaluation. The concept of policy evaluation 
involves many theories, models and definitions. William Trochim (2009, p.23), professor of policy 
analysis and management at Cornell University, defines policy evaluation in a broad manner as 
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follows: “evaluation is undertaken to assess processes, effectiveness, and impacts to improve 
programs and enhance accountability.” For the purpose of this thesis, these guidelines will be 
followed in the evaluation of Russia’s counter-terrorism policy in relation to Beslan and the 
aftermath. Throughout the thesis, it will become clear whether counter-terrorism policy and 
collaboration within Russia’s power vertical (the top-down structure of command created during 
Putin’s presidency) can be considered as effective. Furthermore, a multi-method approach is applied 
in regard to the counter-terrorism policy of the Russian Federation. To specify, the legislation and 
laws, security reforms, the Russian public perception and the rhetoric of the Russian media will serve 
as the framework of this thesis.  
 Thus, statistical data by leading research organizations, terrorism and counter-terrorism 
legislation and laws in Russia as well as in the United States and the United Kingdom, experts on 
Russian terrorism and its history, experts on the event of Beslan and leading newspapers will be the 
primary sources of this analysis.  In addition, surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation 
and the Levada-Centre are drawn upon in order to analyze Russian public perception. By doing so, 
the counter-terrorism policy of Russia will be placed in a broader context.  
 
1.4 Justification 
Terrorism merits study because it remains a contemporary threat to daily life. One could argue that, 
in terms of terrorist attacks, the abnormal has become normal within the Russian Federation. One 
could even argue that Russia is the architect of its own misfortune in relation to terrorist activity. The 
Russian struggle regarding terrorism is complex and it plays a prominent role in society. Russia is 
experiencing all sorts of attacks that differ in magnitude. The majority of attacks take place in 
Moscow, southern Russia and the North Caucasus. These attacks are committed primarily by North 
Caucasians. Russia’s counter-terrorism policy is based on legislation, laws and in the practices on the 
ground. It is evident that counter-terrorism legislation, laws and practices on the ground face on-
going developments and should therefore be subjected to evaluation and modification occasionally. 
The impact of a tragedy like Beslan can inter alia expose itself in certain manners such as a general 
feeling of fear in a society, the capability or incapability of security forces and intelligence services, 
media rhetoric and legislation and laws.  
 
1.5 Limitations 
This thesis has a number of limitations. First of all, there is a lack of interviews due to the 
questionable truthfulness in regard to this ‘sensitive’ and delicate subject as well as a lack of contacts 
with the expertise in high positions in the Russian government and terrorist organizations. In 
addition, there is undoubtedly information that is kept from the public and media; this means 
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classified and secret information withheld by both the Russian government and the terrorists and 
terrorist organizations. Another limitation is my interpretation of the documents. The penultimate 
limitation is a lack of Russian language sources. This research will therefore mainly depend on 
‘Western-point of view’ sources.  As a final limitation, the conclusions of this thesis are limited to the 
information that was accessible at the time this research was conducted.  
 
1.6 Chapter overview 
This thesis is compiled into three main chapters and an accompanying conclusion which proceeds as 
follows. Chapter 2 sets the scene of the 1990s as a prelude to the tragedy of Beslan in 2004. This 
chapter also serves to delineate terrorist activity and the degree of religion and nationalism in the 
North Caucasus as well as the actual definitions of terrorism that are used by Russia, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). This will be followed by an analysis of the 
situation concerning Beslan in relation to the actual course of the event, the hostage-takers and their 
motives as well as the importance of the event.  
              Henceforth, the thesis will focus on the crucial aspects concerning counter-terrorism policy 
and public perceptions. Chapter 3 analyzes the counter-terrorism policy and changes in legislation, 
laws and security reforms. This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the legislation and laws 
prior to Beslan as well as new or amended laws in the aftermath of Beslan. Besides legislation and 
laws, the security measurements and reforms will be analyzed with Beslan as the main point of focus. 
The city of Nalchik in the autonomous Kabardino-Balkar Republic will serve as a second case study 
due to the significant impact of the terrorist attack in 2005 and its geographical position in the North 
Caucasus. Chapter 4 focuses on the role of the media and accompanying rhetoric concerning 
counter-terrorism policy. Moreover, this penultimate chapter provides insights into Russian citizens’ 
perceptions of counter-terrorism and Russia’s efforts to improve counter-terrorism policy. This 
chapter concludes with the link between the general perceptions of terrorism amongst the Russian 
public and actual terrorist activity after Beslan. Each individual chapter will end with a concise and 
coherent conclusion. Finally, chapter 5 will provide an overall concluding answer to the 
aforementioned research question.  
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Chapter 2 – Road to Beslan 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the historical and contemporary plight of terrorism within the 
Russian Federation. By identifying the historical nature of terrorism, one is able to determine the 
contemporary Russian definition of terrorism. First of all, section 2.1 explains the impetuous epoch of 
the 1990s, highlighted by conflicts between Russia and Chechnya, which serves as an explanation for 
the augmentation of terrorist activity in the aftermath of the two wars. Section 2.2 showcases the 
terrorist activity, its origin and the accompanying role of Islam within the Russian Federation and the 
North Caucasus. This section also demonstrates the magnitude of the issue of terrorism within the 
Russian Federation. Section 2.3 delineates the transformation of Russia’s definition of terrorism and 
ends with the contemporary definition. In addition, the following sub-section attempts to highlight 
the differences between Russia’s definition of terrorism from those of the UK and USA to create 
better understanding. Section 2.4 explains the actual tragedy of Beslan and its importance as a 
potential turning point in policy. The sections following elaborate on the Beslan section by describing 
the hostage-takers, their motives and the importance of the event in a broader sense.  
 
2.1 Russia-Chechnya conflict 
One of the key events during the 1990s was the conflict between Russia and Chechnya. This thesis 
questions whether this conflict could have been a catalyst for terrorist activity in the aftermath. The 
post-Soviet conflict between Russia and Chechnya resulted in multiple bilateral wars throughout the 
1990s. These conflicts were an outgrowth of the eradication of religious and ethnic institutions by 
the Soviet regime. In the early years, after the dissolution of the USSR, the ideology of nationalism 
became the primary ideology of separatist groups situated in the North Caucasus (Zhemukhov, 2013, 
p.2). Therefore, large numbers of North Caucasian separatist groups were driven by strong 
nationalist feelings. One can link the increased feeling of nationalism in the 1990s to the political 
destabilization as well as to the poor socio-economic situation in the region, which was a direct result 
of the collapse of the Soviet-Union.     
The republics situated in the North Caucasus became ostensibly independent but remained 
under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the early 1990s. The early 1990s were turbulent 
times for the Russian Federation and the North Caucasus (Zhemukhov, 2013, p.2). The Chechen 
general Dzhokhar Dudayev seized power in 1991 and declared the independence of Chechnya 
without the approval of the President of the Russian Federation at that time, Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin 
executed a number of attempts to rein in Dudayev without great success due to the dissolution and 
other domestic problems that Russia faced at that time. It was therefore, in 1994, that Boris Yeltsin 
launched a military campaign against the rebellious Chechens. By that time, Russia had been able to 
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recover as a state and to strengthen its military forces. Nevertheless, the Chechen forces were able 
to resist the Russian troops. This eventually led to massive air and artillery bombings for two months 
before the federal army captured Grozny2. As a result, there were over 20,000 casualties, the whole 
city of Grozny was destroyed and thousands of people were displaced (Cornell, 2003, p.170). In 1996, 
the Chechen forces were able to recapture three important cities, including Grozny, despite the fact 
that the Chechen general Dudayev was assassinated by the Russian troops. The period prior to 1999 
can be marked as an impetuous period with continuous bombings in Russia by terrorists as well as in 
Chechnya by Russian troops.  
The second Chechen war started in August 1999 as a result of the invasion of Dagestan by 
Islamic militants from Chechnya led by Shamil Basayev. Another trigger that led to the start of the 
second war was the apartment bombing in Moscow, which the Russian government blamed on the 
Chechens, that caused 300 casualties. According to Trenin, Senior Associate and Deputy Director at 
Moscow Carnegie Center, the second military campaign was aimed at “defeating Chechen separatism 
and the safe haven it provided for terrorism” (Trenin, 2003, p.2). Although the Russian government 
declared its victory over terrorists in 2000, the number of terrorist attacks severely intensified. Due 
to the brutal actions–from Chechen point of view–by the Russian troops against the Chechen 
population, the feeling of revenge increased.  The result of the second campaign was the restoration 
of the Chechen government in which Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov3 as interim head of the new 
pro-Moscow government. According to independent observers, the elections were characterized by 
intimidation of voters, falsification of results as well as harassment of other candidates that led to a 
landslide victory for Kadyrov (Brouwers, 2007, p.4). 
The two wars with Chechnya can therefore be marked as key events during the 1990s related 
to terrorism. Hence, the largest threat of terrorism that Russia faces has its origin primarily in 
Chechnya. Thus, Russia’s counter-terrorism legislation is for the most part based on the intensified 
Chechen, Islamic and, in a broader perspective, the North Caucasian threat.   
 
2.2 Terrorism in the Russian Federation  
Terrorism in Russia is a nationwide phenomenon. However, the threat of terrorism in Russia is mainly 
caused by terrorist activity from the North Caucasian terrorists. The following map (The Guardian, 
2013) reveals the locations of terrorist attacks since 1991:   
 
 
                                                             
2 Grozny is the capital city of Chechnya. 
3 Akhmad Kadyrov: a former separatist who sided with the Russian government at the start of the second Chechen war in 
the late 1990s and therefore became the most favored candidate from Kremlin perspective.  
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 Figure 2: Map of terrorist activity in the Russian Federation (Guardian, 2013) 
 
The map above shows a clear emphasis on the terrorist activity in the North Caucasus in terms of 
terrorist activity. Besides the North Caucasus, Moscow is, although far less, the second most intense 
point of focus for terrorist activity. Prior to the Beslan hostage crisis, the 1990s were characterized by 
attacks throughout Russia and specifically in the North Caucasus region. This brief prelude to the 
Beslan tragedy focuses primarily on the terrorist activities in the North Caucasus due to the specific 
focus on this region and the important aspect of separatism.  
              According to the official definition in the Oxford Dictionary, separatism is defined as: “the 
advocacy or practice of separation of a certain group of people from a larger body on the basis of 
ethnicity, religion, or gender” (Oxford dictionary, 2014). However, in the specific case of Beslan, one 
could say that separatism nowadays is linked much more to ethnic groups who are aiming at 
independence and who are therefore willing to use violence. Therefore, although the Russian 
Federation experienced occasional acts of terrorism4 prior to the 1990s, the Russian Federation 
experienced a significant change from occasional and unique attacks to a systematic and structural 
terrorism threat during the 1990s and onwards. The relationship between Russia and the south-
periphery has always been difficult and complex due to multicultural diversity in the regions as well 
as rebellious minority peoples (Thumann, 2001, p.193). This has been the case under Tsarist rule as 
well as under the Soviet regime and one could claim that this problem is still contemporary.  
              The two important factors in regard to this problem are nationalism and Islam. Obviously, it is 
certainly not the case that every Muslim can be considered an extremist but throughout the last two 
decades, splinter groups have developed into ‘Jihadi’ movements that conduct terrorist activities 
(Zhemukhov, 2013, p.3). The following figure shows the ideological division in the North Caucasus in 
the 2000s: 
 
                                                             
4 Armenian nationalists who bombed the Metro in Moscow in 1977 as well as a hijacking attempt by a group of youths at 
the airport of Tbilisi in Georgia in 1984 were considered unique events in the Russian Federation (Soviet-Union) prior to the 
1990s.  
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                                               East  West  
Geographical division  Chechnya  
Dagestan  
Ingushetia  
Adygea  
Kabardino-Balkaria  
Karachaevo-Cherkessia  
North Ossetia  
Major ideological trends  Radical Islam  
Moderate Islam  
Nationalism  
Radical Islam  
Moderate Islam  
Traditionalistic Islam  
Historical differences in the 
approach to Islam  
Islamic Imamate (1829–1859)  Islamic-nationalistic Circassian 
state (1861–1864)  
Practical differences in the 
approach to Islam  
Shaafi school  Hanafi school  
Religion  Islam  Christianity and Islam  
External influence  No diasporas  Large diasporas  
Figure 2: Ideological Division in the North Caucasus in 2000s  (Zhemukhov, 2013, p.5) 
 
As the table above shows, the role of Islam is clearly visible throughout the North Caucasus. The 
combination of nationalism and radical Islam within the North Caucasus is considered to be the 
largest threat to Russia in terms of terrorism. Therefore, the definition of terrorism by the Russian 
Federation may very well differ from other countries and states. By defining terrorism, one can 
implement appropriated policy and legislation which effectively combats terrorism. Furthermore, 
one should bear in mind that the definition of terrorism is interpreted differently worldwide. For 
example, the United Kingdom and the United States have a different definition of terrorism than 
Russia. By analyzing the definitions from the UK and the USA, one is able to determine the 
differences in terms of interpretation and could gain a better understanding of the term terrorism 
applied in Russia. 
 
2.3 Terrorism definition in Russia 
The definition of terrorism in Russia experienced several small transformations since the late 1980s. 
In an article by the International Federation of Human Rights (2009, p.4), “the murder of a politician, 
public figure or government agent committed with the aim of undermining or weakening Soviet 
power was deemed an act of terrorism” in the Criminal Code of the USSR. Onwards, in 1997, the 
director of the Federal Security Service, Nikolay Kovalev, stated that “Russia faced three main types 
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of terrorism: [1] social, which aims at political and economic changes [2] nationalist and ethno-
separatist and [3] religious” (Smith, 2004, p.2). However, in practice, Russia’s struggle against 
terrorism within the Russian Federation has concentrated on Chechen terrorism. Russia perceives 
Chechen terrorism as a mixture of the three main types of terrorism. However, according to Smith, 
the “actions have not been exclusively concentrated on Chechnya and other parts of southern Russia, 
but this region has understandably been the main focus” (Smith, 2004, p.2). 
 The definition of terrorism in the mid-1990s does not significantly differ from the 
contemporary definition of terrorism that is used by Russia due to its permanent focus on terrorism 
coming from the North Caucasus. However, the most recent definition of terrorism in Russia is 
defined in the law “On Counteraction to Terrorism” of 2006 which reads as follows: “terrorism is an 
ideology of violence and a practice affecting the way decisions are made by national and local 
authorities or international organisations, related to intimidation of the population and (or) to other 
illegal violent acts” (Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2008).  
 Besides the definition of terrorism, the 2006 law also defines counter-terrorism within three 
dimensions as follows: “preventing of terrorism; the fight against terrorism; and the mitigation and 
management of its consequences” (Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2008). To further specify, 
prevention of terrorism is related to the elimination of the conditions that potentially give rise to acts 
of terrorism whereas the fight against terrorism represents measures to suppress terrorist activity. 
The 2006 law will be further analyzed in the third chapter within the section of laws and legislation in 
the aftermath of Beslan.  
 
2.3.1. Definition in UK and USA 
The United Kingdom5 defines terrorism as follows:  “[1] the use or threat of action where the use or 
threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and [2] it involves serious violence against a 
person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person 
committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.” (United 
Kingdom Terrorism Act, 2000). The United States of America and the U.S Department of Defense 
(2008) define terrorism as: “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals 
that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” In an article by Aleksandr Kuznetcov and Vasilii 
                                                             
5 United Kingdom; England, Wales, Scotland and Northern-Ireland share a common definition of terrorism.  
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Kuznetcov (2013, p.131), the term terrorism is further specified as follows: “to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect 
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” 
 Following the aforementioned terrorism definitions, the conclusion can be made that in 
general, the definitions and perceptions of Russia, the UK and the USA share many similarities. 
However, one can also conclude that Russia has a slightly different interpretation of the term 
terrorism. As stated, Russia faces “three main types of terrorism: social, which aims at political and 
economic changes; nationalist and ethno-separatist; and religious” (Smith, 2004, p.2). Although it is 
not included in Russia’s 2006 definition, the most important difference is evidently Russia’s focus on 
the North Caucasus threat, whereas the UK and the USA share a more internationally-oriented focus.  
In other words, within the three main types of terrorism, the factor of ethno-separatism is absent 
within the definitions of the UK and the USA. It is important to bear in mind that the definitions of 
terrorism by Russia, the UK and the USA are personal definitions due to the fact that a universal 
definition of terrorism remains absent.  
 
2.4 Beslan tragedy 
It is crucial to explain why Beslan specifically, among so many other attacks, can be perceived as a 
turning point with regard to counter-terrorism policy. The Beslan tragedy distinguishes itself from 
other terrorist attacks that have occurred in the history of the Russian Federation due to its 
magnitude and complexity. I acknowledge that, in terms of hostage-taking tragedies, the terrorist 
attacks of Budennovsk (1995), Kizlyar (1996) and Dubrovka (2002) were also momentous acts that 
threatened the security of the Russian Federation (Gilligan, 2013, p.8). However, the main reasons 
for considering Beslan a potential turning point are the extremely high level of hostages (1300), 
fatalities (372) and injuries (747), the cruel acts of the terrorists towards children and women, the 
long duration of the siege (3 days), the well-preparedness of the perpetrators that led to severe 
issues among the responsible security services at the time of the siege as well as the fact that Beslan 
was a global media event which led to questions about the capability of Russia to prevent and to 
manage terrorist attacks (Johnston, 2014; Tuathail, 2009, p.4;  Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p.1). In face of 
the large number of fatalities, it is surprising that the post-Beslan changes in counter-terrorism policy 
were minimal and modest.  
However, before analyzing policy change, it is important to contextualize the Beslan tragedy 
within three historical geopolitical processes which could explain the direct or indirect cause. The 
first process is the ongoing ethnical problem within the Caucasus region in combination with Russia’s 
expansion into the region and centralized its power (Tuathail, 2009, p.6-7). Russian imperialism 
eventually led to the Caucasian war which dated from 1817 to 1864. Among Circassia, the Northwest 
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Caucasus, modern Krasnodar Krai, and the republics of Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia and Abkhazia 
were subjected to the Russian military forces. In the specific case of Beslan, it is important to focus 
on the Chechens and Ingush because the hostage-takers were mainly of Chechen or Ingush origin. 
Russia’s raid into the North Caucasus led to ethnic and confessional otherness in the already complex 
ethno-cultural structure within the region that continued during the aftermath of the Caucasian war. 
The Caucasians were victims of Stalin’s deportation process. Stalin deported the Ingush and 
Chechens and transferred most of Ingushetia’s territory to North Ossetian control. In 1956, under 
Nikita Khrushchev, the Ingush were allowed to return to their ancestral lands and Ingush lands were 
partially restored with the exception of eastern Prigorodnyy.    
The second process is the ethnic secessionism which can be defined as ‘formal separation 
from an alliance or federation’ that followed after the Soviet-Union breakdown. This specific process 
can be divided in two major events. The first was the rise of Ingush-Ossetian tensions due to the 
Ingush activists who were claiming Prigorodnyy territory. The second was the Chechen battle for 
independence from Russia under the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev.  As a result, the first Chechen 
war that lasted from 1994 to 1996 led to a large number of casualties as well as an increase of 
terrorist attacks.  
The third process is linked to the rise of Putin and his military re-assertion of Russian power 
in the unstable and erratic Caucasus region that led to the second Chechen war. During this war, 
Putin used aerial bombings and merciless shelling against the citizens of Grozny (Tuathail, 2009, p.6). 
According to Sagramoso, Ph.D. at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University 
College London, the number of fatalities during this war, among Chechens as well as Ingush, were 
between 10,000 and 20,000; another 300,000 Chechens were forced to leave the republic and were 
held in camps in Ingushetia (Sagramoso, 2007, p.701). This process of ‘modern deportation’ was 
known as ‘mop up operations’. In Putin’s view, the Chechen war was now couched in the ‘global war 
on terror’ that was worldwide deployed after 9/11 in 2001 in the United States. The Chechens and 
Ingush were exposed to years of violence, domination, torture and death.   
Putin’s approach combined with the historical events concerning the North Caucasians 
(Chechens and Ingush) described above led to a peak in terrorist attacks in 1994 and could therefore 
serve as the alleged cause of the Beslan attack.   
 
2.4.1 Hostage takers 
Who were the actual perpetrators of this tragedy: ‘international terrorists,’ ‘Chechen rebels’ or 
‘Jihadis’? According to Vladimir Bobrovnikov from the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies, the al-
Riyad al-Salihin group carried out the attack (Bobrovnikov, 2005, p.13). This group can be classified as 
Caucasian Muslims who, in the specific case of Beslan, can be further categorized into Chechens, 
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Ingush and Daghestanis. The leader of the Chechen nationalists, Shamil Basayev, took responsibility 
for initiating and planning the attack. However, the leaders on the ground were the Ingush Ruslan 
Khachubarov, the Ukrainian Vladimir Khodov, who was raised in North Ossetia and the Chechen 
Nurpashi Kulayev. Kulayev happened to be the only one to survive the siege but was sentenced to life 
in prison. All three leaders on the ground at Beslan were driven to kill because of personal tragedies 
related to family losses at the hand of Russian forces.   
 Besides the mentioned perpetrators, there were also four women, classified as ‘black 
widows’, at the site. Black widows6 can be defined as “Chechen women committed to suicide 
missions, and who have been involved in numerous terrorist acts in Russia” (Banovac et al., 2007, 
p.71). The majority of black widows seek revenge by suicide-bombings due to the loss of their 
husbands or children at the hands of Russian forces. These black widows are considered a serious 
threat to Russia’s safety in general.  
 In any case, concerning Beslan, the perpetrators were very well-prepared for the assault 
(Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p.1). This argument is supported by Stepanova (2004, p.2) who states that: 
“among other things, pre-planted weapons and explosives were hidden beneath the school’s 
floorboards during renovation work over the summer.” Furthermore, the gunmen installed several 
remote control surveillance cameras throughout the school building, were in possession of gas masks 
and took medical substances to stay alert during the siege (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p1).  This proves the 
determination and tactic skills of the perpetrators to create detrimental results at the Beslan site. 
This also could explain the difficulties faced by the authorities charged with handling these kinds of 
attacks.  
 
2.4.2 Motives  
What have been the underlying motives for the perpetrators and why? The alleged main motive 
behind the attack was to raise national and international attention to the cruelties, in their view, 
against the Chechens and Ingush. According to Shamil Basayev, Beslan would not be the only attack.  
Basayev promised further Beslan-like operations, if only, he explained, “to show the world, again and 
again, the true face of the Russian regime, the true face of Putin with his satanic horns so that the 
world sees his true face. In order to stop the genocide, we will stop at nothing” (Channel Four News, 
2005). In fact, there were two sets of demands, that is, from the Ingush side and Chechen side 
(Tuathail, 2009, p.8). This argument is supported in an article by Plater-Zyberk (2004, p.2) in which it 
is pointed out that the hostage-takers demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya, 
the release of terrorists that had been caught by Russian forces in Ingushetia and the combined 
                                                             
6 In Russia, a black widow is named a Shahidka, which means a female martyr.   
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demand of the immediate resignation of Vladimir Putin. The unrealistic demands eventually led to a 
shootout in which Russian forces killed the terrorists in a gunfire. During this battle, the terrorists did 
not seem to spare children, as they killed as many hostages as they could (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p.5).  
 Basayev was determined to depict the Russians as evil and ignorant. In the article of Tuathail 
(2009, p.8), Shamil Basayev, pressed by Channel Four News in 2005, stated that “you must 
understand us correctly. We are at war. Russians approve of Putin’s policies. They pay their taxes for 
this war, send their solders to this war, their priests sprinkle hold water on their soldiers and bless 
their heroic duty, calling them ‘heroic defenders of the fatherland.’ And we’re just ‘terrorists.’ How 
can they be innocent? Russians are accomplices in this war. It’s just that they don’t all have weapons 
in their hands.” This statement by Basayev implies a strong feeling of revenge-seeking from the 
Chechen side against Russian targets as well as a justification of their actions by blaming the Russians 
in general. One could conclude that Basayev placed the responsibility for Beslan on the Russians.  
 
2.4.3 Importance  
The Beslan terrorist attack shocked Russian society as well the international community and was 
therefore marked as Russia’s 9/11. According to Uwe Kloessman, leading journalist from Der Spiegel, 
the Russian security forces were unable to cooperate with the police and army, which draws 
similarities from the 9/11 final report that basically concluded a lack of anticipation of the attacks 
and cooperation with one another (Kloesmann, 2005).  
The Washington Post (2005) gained access to the official report, consisting of 60,000 pages, 
on Beslan which concluded that the Russian authorities were warned in advance that Chechen rebels 
were planning a hostage situation at the primary school in Beslan during the first classes of the year. 
However, local authorities ignored instructions despite several warnings by the Russian Ministry of 
Interior, which wanted to have tightened security at the school site. Following the findings of the 
report, there was only one unarmed policewoman stationed in front of the school when the rebels 
sieged the site. Alexander Torshin, chairman of the ‘parliamentary commission’ on Beslan, was cited 
by CBC News (2005), stating that “the counter-terrorist operation was plagued by shortcomings [...] 
Many law enforcement officers did not know how to act in an emergency situation.” In addition, 
Omelicheva stated that the tragedy in Beslan exposed the shortcomings in intelligence management 
as well as errors in the dissemination of public information (Omelicheva, 2012). 
If one assumes that the report by the parliamentary commission is based on true facts and 
not an instrument for federal ministries and leaders to exculpate themselves, it might actually shed a 
different light on Russia’s counter-terrorism policy. It could  imply that there might be a link between 
the ignorance, indolence as well as incapability of the local authorities and alleged inefficient 
counter-terrorism laws. However, Vladimir Ryzhkov, a Russian State Duma deputy from 1993 to 
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2007, was cited by the Washington Post (2005) stated that the report “is an attempt to put the 
blame on regional and local law enforcers and not on the leaders of federal ministries, who in my 
view bear responsibility for what happened [..] they didn't take preventive measures. They didn't 
check how their orders were being carried out.”  
Interestingly, Beslan was certainly not the first hostage crisis in Russia. In 1995, Shamil 
Basayev seized a hospital in Budennovsk, located in Dagestan. At the end of the siege, Basayev and 
his forces were allowed to return to Chechnya while 147 hostages lost their lives (Forster, 2006, p.2).  
It seems that the Russian security services continuously fail to integrate previous experiences into 
new strategic policy and execution on the ground. I acknowledge the fact that every crisis has its own 
differences and complexities, but a certain level of preparedness and coordination can make the 
rescue operation or any form of prevention more successful. In the specific case of Beslan, one could 
argue that negotiations would have been a better instrument than the use of excessive violence by 
storming the school with heavy arms (Forster, 2006, p.3). Ideally, further research could expose the 
overall proficiency of the local authorities in regard to the counter-terrorism approach.   
 At first, the government was unwilling to accept the mistakes that were evidently made in 
connection with Beslan, but, in 2005, The Moscow Times wrote that Vladimir Putin accepted guilt for 
the Beslan tragedy and therefore wanted to revitalize the investigation in which findings would be 
used to reform police and security services (The Moscow Times, 2005). This statement by Putin 
implies that the security services were not able to protect its citizens and thus, at least, needed 
evaluation. Although Putin’s statement suggested that Russia would seriously investigate the 
tragedy, Banovac et al. state that the authorities failed to do so (Banovac et al., 2007, p.33). The most 
important factor has been the misplacement as well as the loss of significant evidence from the site. 
In addition, the authorities in charge failed to seal off the site, which is a requirement for proper 
investigation. In that regard, “there were no fences, no gates to keep visitors away” (Smith, 2004). 
Hence, an objective and thorough investigation seems to be impossible due to the significantly 
disturbed site. This is supported by the Russian journalist Voronov, who was present at the site 
during the siege and stated that “there was a whole crowd of officials, both local and federal, but no 
one managed anything. So, it’s not really surprising that 10 years later the official version of the 
incident is full of obscurities and half-explained facts” (Voronov, 2014). Therefore, investigators are 
forced to rely on eyewitnesses who can be considered as somewhat unreliable. In an article by 
Natalia Wolchover, Dr. Wise, a forensic psychologist at the University of Dakota state that: “to fill in 
gaps in memory, the eyewitness relies upon his or her expectation, attitudes, prejudices, bias, and 
prior knowledge. Furthermore, information supplied to an eyewitness after a crime (i.e., post-event 
information) by the police, prosecutor, other eyewitnesses, media, etc., can alter an eyewitness' 
memory of the crime” (Wolchover, 2012). Evidently, these latter factors did not contribute to the 
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creation of decent circumstances for a thorough investigation. One could conclude that the Russian 
counter-terrorism authorities are, to some extent, unable to learn from similar events in the past. 
There seems to be a structural lack of efficient and clear policy, knowledge and action in regard to 
counter-terrorism combat.        
 In a quote, following Beslan, by Putin admits to the structural weakness of Russia and 
compares the terrorists to germs and Russia to a vulnerable body: “when a man is born, some 
disease-causing germs, some viruses appear almost immediately in his organism endangering his 
health. But if the organism grows strong and powerful then its immunity suppresses all these 
disease-causing germs and viruses. As soon as the organism weakens, they all flare up in a life-
threatening disease. This is the way it happened with us […] We need to put right the system of 
power in the country, we need to create an efficient economy, we need to revitalize the entire 
organism of Russian statehood and the political system” (Lynch, 2005, p.153). However, it seems that 
Putin encouraged the existing policy and legislation at that time and thought that it should be 
continued in order to “build immunity against potential ‘future Beslans’” (Lynch, 2005, p.154). This 
implies that Putin did not necessarily aim at a change in terrorism legislation in the aftermath. 
However, it does not mean that one may assume that there have not been any changes, reforms or 
new legislation in the aftermath.  
 
In sum, the 1990s can be classified as a fluctuating and unstable period with multiple bilateral wars 
between Russia and Chechnya as key events. As a result, the relationship between Russia and 
Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus deteriorated. This fragile situation led to an 
outburst of terrorist attacks within the Russian Federation by Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis and other 
North Caucasian ethnic groups. The historically complex relationship between Russia and its south-
periphery has remained in contemporary times and is primarily manifested in terrorist activity. 
Apparently, this troubled relationship also impedes successful counter-terrorism policy. Russia 
started to experience a systematic and structural terrorism threat during the 1990s and onwards. 
Therefore, Russia’s definition of terrorism differs from that of the USA and the UK due to the specific 
threat of nationalism and Islam from the North Caucasus. The Beslan siege led to a great number of 
fatalities, injuries and traumas among the hostages, hostage-takers, Russian security services and 
families. The responsible authorities failed to prevent the siege and, despite the complexities, to 
handle the situation with care. Following the statements by Putin and his promises, new legislation, 
laws and security reforms were supposed to be implemented after Beslan to combat the great issue 
of terrorism. The following chapter will therefore specifically focus on existing and new or amended 
legislation and laws as well as reforms in the security services.    
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Chapter 3 - Counter-terrorism policy 
This chapter aims to demonstrate Russia’s counter-terrorism policy prior to and after Beslan. In this 
case, the counter-terrorism policy includes legislation, laws and the role of Russia’s security services. 
Section 3.1 analyzes the legislation and laws prior to Beslan in order to establish the basis for any 
post-Beslan changes. The following section, 3.2, analyzes the changes and newly implemented 
legislation and laws in the aftermath of Beslan. The 2006 law serves as the central point of focus due 
to its ostensible potential and importance. Section 3.3 analyzes the post-Beslan reforms within the 
Russian security services. Furthermore, this paragraph aims to explain the difficulties concerning the 
implementation of effective counter-terrorism policy by the Russian government. The sub-section 
3.3.1, which covers the attack in Nalchik in 2005, aims to prove that the authorities are unable or 
unwilling to learn lessons from previous events. This sub-section also serves to demonstrate that the 
execution on the ground by the responsible security services has not significantly improved after 
Beslan. By analyzing the counter-terrorism legislation, laws and the security reforms, one is able to 
determine whether Beslan can be considered as an actual turning point in terms of Russian counter-
terrorism policy and to what extent counter-terrorism policy has changed.   
 
3.1 Legislation and laws in the 1990s 
As this thesis partially focuses on counter-terrorism legislation, it is essential to analyze the lack of 
laws and the laws that were in place at that time in order to contextualize the two wars (Russia-
Chechnya) and to create a comparison before and after Beslan. In the aftermath of the dissolution of 
the Soviet-Union, the first counter-terrorism law was implemented by the Russian government. This 
law was passed in 1993. This first counter-terrorism law basically represented a widening of the 
previously stated definition which now included practices such as the ‘hijacking of airplanes’. It took 
another four years before a new Criminal Code was implemented which primarily provided 
punishment parameters for terrorists (Article 205). Terrorism as a crime was introduced in 1994 into 
the Russian Federation Criminal Code. In this specific year, 18 cases of terrorism were registered. This 
number increased to 327 cases by 2001 and further increased to 402 by 2002.   
 Four years later in 1998, a new counter-terrorism law, signed by Boris Yeltsin and named ‘On 
the Fight against Terrorism’ came into force and replaced the former law. This new law extended the 
previous law which now defined concepts like ‘terrorist organization’ and ‘act of terrorism’ while at 
the same time created ‘the institutional framework of actions undertaken in this sphere, as well as 
the rights and obligations of citizens’ (International Federation of Human Rights, 2009). According to 
Omelicheva, the 1998 law became the main pillar of counter-terrorism laws that were implemented 
in the 1990s (Omelicheva, 2009, p.4). The 1998 law, which includes 29 articles, is defined as follows: 
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“the legal and organizational basis of the fight against terrorism in the Russian Federation, the 
procedure for coordinating the activities of federal organs of executive power, organs of executive 
power of the Russian Federation components, public associations and organizations regardless of 
forms of ownership, officials, and individual citizens implementing the fight against terrorism, and 
also citizens' rights, duties, and guarantees in connection with the fight against terrorism” (Federal 
Law No. 130-FZ, 1998). As a framework, this comprehensive law covered the establishment of the 
agencies who became responsible for the fight against terrorism. The responsible federal agencies 
were the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service, 
the Federal Protection Service, the Defense Ministry and the Federal Border Service with the Russian 
government as the overarching responsible entity. Each agency was tasked with different 
responsibilities due to the difference in competences. This law created possibilities to legally fight 
terrorism and thus protected the state, society and the individual against terrorism by preventing, 
uncovering and stopping terrorist activity while at the same time minimizing the consequences of 
terrorism. Furthermore, the responsible agencies within in the counter-terrorist operation zone were 
now legally permitted to take necessary measures to prohibit the movement of vehicles on streets 
and highways, to check random individuals for identity documentation and to detain individuals if 
the necessary documentation was absent, free entry to housing, territory and premises of individuals 
and organizations and to detain suspects and to use certain means of communication for official 
purposes.  Procedures concerning negotiations with terrorists have been created with this law that 
gave exclusive authorization for persons appointed by the leader of the operational staff (Federal 
Law No. 130-FZ, 1998). This law is thus rather broad without genuinely specific or more detailed 
measures to effectively combat terrorism. Therefore, although the law is conceived as the main pillar 
of counter-terrorism legislation in the 1990s, the 1998 law does not focus on the North Caucasus and 
Islam despite the intensified activity in that region. In the context of Beslan, this law inter alia 
focused on counter-terrorism operations7. This implies that counter-terrorism operational units or 
teams were aware of the procedures to take during a terrorist act or siege. However, the previous 
chapter elaborated on the failures of the operational units concerning the course of the Beslan 
event.    
The implemented laws in the 1990s imply that there were laws in place that were gradually 
expanded with new definitions or amendments throughout the years. Although I acknowledge that 
counter-terrorism laws cannot eradicate terrorism as a whole for any state in the world, these new 
laws did not seem an obstacle for terrorists in rendering their activities.  
 
                                                             
7 Federal Law No. 130-FZ, 1998 – Chapter 3, articles 10 -16 
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3.2 Post-Beslan legislation and laws  
As stated earlier, laws on counter-terrorism were implemented throughout the 1990s. Prior to the 
Beslan tragedy, the Russian government already implemented numerous laws. One can make a 
distinction in laws by subdividing the laws into [1] constitutional laws [2] primary legislation [3] and 
secondary legislation:  
 
 ‘Constitutional law: 
o Federal Constitutional Law No.3-FKZ On the State of Emergency (2001, as amended 
2005). 
 Primary legislation: 
o Federal Law No. 130-FZ on The Fight against Terrorism. 
o Federal Law No. 226-FZ on the Federal Security Service (1999 as amended 2011). 
o Federal Law No. 114 FZ on combating of extremist activity (2002 as amended 2008). 
o Federal Law No. 115-FZ on Countering Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism (2001 as amended 2004). 
 Secondary legislation: 
o Presidential Decree No. 6 on measures to fulfill the resolution of the UN Security 
Council No 1373 adopted 28 September 2001 (2002).’  
(Legislationonline.org, 2013). 
 
Besides the implemented legislation prior to 2004, the Russian government implemented new and 
amended laws after Beslan in 2004: 
 
 ‘Primary legislation: 
o Federal Law No. 114 FZ on Combating of extremist activity (2002 as amended 2008). 
o Federal Law No. 35-FZ on Counteraction of Terrorism (2006 as amended 2008). 
o Federal Law No. 218-FZ on amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian 
Federation (2013). 
 Secondary legislation: 
o Presidential Decree No. 1167 on Urgent Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of 
the Struggle against Terrorism (13 September, 2004).’ 
(Legislationonline.org, 2013). 
 
The Federal Law No. 114-FZ ‘on combating of extremist activity’ was adopted in 2002 and was 
amended in 2008. This law primarily reflects the combat of extremism which is defined as the: 
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“forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the integrity of the 
Russian Federation” (Federal Law No. 114 FZ). This law furthermore focuses on the international 
cooperation to fight extremism. The aspect of international cooperation in fighting extremism and 
combating terrorism is a significant departure from the laws and legislation prior to Beslan.  
 One may wonder whether the newly implemented legislation and laws can be linked directly 
to the actual event of Beslan. However, one can assume that the new counter-terrorism law of 2006 
can explicitly be linked to Beslan. In Putin’s post-Beslan speech, he stated: “I think it is necessary to 
create a new system of coordinating the forces and means responsible for exercising control over the 
situation in the North Caucasus […] we need to create an effective anti-crisis management system 
including entirely new approaches to the way the law enforcement agencies work” (Putin, 2004). 
Inter alia, the new 2006 law was therefore the outcome of Beslan. The draft of this law arose in the 
immediate aftermath of Beslan as a response to the tragedy. This draft had already passed its first 
reading in December 2004, but, according to Abdullaev & Saradzhyan, “due to widespread criticism, 
it took the authors a year and half to agree on the final text” (Abdullaev & Saradzhyan, 2006, p.197). 
The widespread criticism reflected the haste in which the Duma’s Security Committee established the 
draft in the aftermath Beslan. Furthermore, according to Abdullaev & Saradzhyan, “further delay was 
apparently due to the Kremlin’s inability to decide quickly which agency would take the lead in the 
anti-terrorist effort and how it would be organized institutionally” (Abdullaev & Saradzhyan, 2006, 
p.197).  
 The 2006 law is considered to be important as it should have represented a comprehensive 
piece of legislation that consisted of a broad range of preventive measures as well as policies aimed 
to protect infrastructure and Russian citizens from terrorist activity. The 2006 law is similar to the law 
of 1998 in terms of scope and structure. However, the newer law covers new aspects and takes a 
different direction which ostensibly created hopeful expectations. The 20068 law ‘Counteraction of 
terrorism’ consists of 27 articles. This new law established: “the fundamental principles of 
counteraction terrorism, the legal and organizational basics of preventing terrorism and struggling 
against it, of reducing to a minimum and (or) liquidating the consequences of manifestations thereof, 
as well as the legal and organizational basics of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 
struggling against terrorism” (Federal law, No. 35-FZ, 2006). The conclusion can be made that the 
2006 laws builds upon the 1998 law but with a more specific and detailed text.  In contrast to the 
1998 law, this new law furthermore covers international cooperation against terrorism; a revised 
organizational structure with the president and government of the Russian Federation as central 
decision-makers from the top, which means the responsibilities of operational staff are now 
                                                             
8 For more specific information on this 2006 law: Legislationline.org – Russian Federation – Federal Law No. 35-FZ.   
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appointed by the government rather than the operational staffs themselves; suppressing any form of 
terrorism in the air, in the inland waters, in the territorial sea and on the ground as well as a new 
greater role for the Russian armed forces and military units in counter-terrorist operations has been 
legitimized in the document. In addition, the legal regime of an anti-terrorist operation has been 
expanded, giving the government full control over telephone communication as well control over 
electronic channels in order to gain important information, banning and restricting of the sale of 
weapons, explosives and poisonous substances and improving of public order maintenance at the 
anti-terrorist operational zone.   
 Furthermore, due to this law, legal possibilities have been created to prohibit organizations 
in the Russian Federation who support or justify terrorist activity. The procedures concerning anti-
terrorist operations have also tightened (Federal law, No. 35-FZ, 2006).  This means that operational 
units are permitted to impose a 60-day clampdown in suspicious regions where a terrorist attack 
might be planned. The tapping of telephone conversations and restricting of communication are now 
legitimate within anti-terrorist operation zones. Hence, this 2006 law is more comprehensive than 
the 1998 law as it provides more instruments and possibilities for the responsible operational units 
to combat terrorism. Furthermore, according to Luchterhandt, from the faculty of Law at the 
University of Hamburg, the changes in the 2006 counter-terrorism law “relate to the re-distribution 
of responsibilities among the various executive branch agencies, including the military. Furthermore, 
the law defines the mission area for counter-terrorism measures and gives the executive branch 
broader rights to encroach on civilian life” (Luchterhandt, 2006, p.2). In other words, this law has 
tightened and streamlined the already existing regulations and expanded all instruments of 
repression. According to Hughes, professor of comparative politics at the London School of 
Economics and author of numerous books on Russian history and politics, this law not only 
criminalizes all forms of terrorist activity but also “inciting terrorism and the propaganda of the idea 
of terrorism, spreading materials or information promoting terrorist activity or justifying and 
approving of the necessity for such activity” (Hughes, n.d, p.296). 
 Although this law may have seemed a first important step in improving counter-terrorism 
policy in the aftermath of Beslan, severe criticism of this law arose and it is perceived to be a 
controversial law.  The 2006 law failed to create a comprehensive law that would define prophylactic 
measures in order to effectively combat terrorism. Furthermore, this new law lacks measures to 
correct the problems revealed by the Beslan tragedy (Luchterhandt, 2006, p.3). Criticism of the 2006 
law is supported by Omelicheva who states that the law has a negative effect on freedom of speech 
in Russia and the openness of debate concerning terrorism (Omelicheva, 2012). This is furthermore 
supported by Nichol, a specialist in Russian and Eurasian affairs, who argues that this law permits 
“police and other security forces to declare a ‘counter-terrorism operations regime’ in a locality and 
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to detain suspects for up to 30 days, search homes, ban public assemblies, and restrict media 
activities without any pre-approval by the courts or legislative oversight” (Nichol, 2009, p.12-13). In 
other words, the new law created possibilities for infringing on the basic rights of people.   
 Nevertheless, in spite of the widespread criticism, the law of 2006 is remarkable in contrast 
to previous laws because it is the first law specific to counter-terrorism. In the aftermath of Beslan, 
this new law defined terrorism as a multi-layered social phenomenon rather than as separate acts 
and methods of committing violence with political goals. The 2006 law was amended in 2008 and 
approved by Dimitri Medvedev and was adopted as Federal Law No. 321-FZ. The amendments 
reflected the abolition of jury trials for terrorist acts. Following the amendments, new cases of 
terrorism were henceforth to be decided by a panel of three judges. 
 In 2013, ahead of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Vladimir Putin signed another law: the 
Federal Law No. 218-FZ ‘On amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation.’ This 
specific law actually builds on the previous Federal Law No. 114-FZ ‘on combating of extremist 
activity’ and can thus be linked to the Olympic Games in Sochi rather than to Beslan. Shortly before 
the Sochi Olympics, Russia was startled by two bombing attacks in two days (Aljazeera, 2013) in the 
city of Volgograd in southern Russia. Presumably, this law could not have prevented these attacks as 
it primarily covers legitimizing criminal liability for individuals or organizations who provide financial 
aid intended for the use of extremist or terrorist activity. Thus, this law creates freedom for detained 
persons if they are willing to share vital information about these practices to the authorities. 
According to the Kremlin, this law furthermore introduced “criminal liability for committing 
extremism-related crimes with the help of information and telecommunications networks, including 
the internet” (Kremlin.ru, 2014). However, by analyzing the previous laws, one could argue that this 
was already legitimate and possible. Therefore, the changes introduced by this law have not been 
that significant compared to previous laws.  
 Besides the 2006 law on counter-terrorism, the amendments in 2008 and the law of 2013 on 
extremism, further changes within the counter-terrorism legislation and laws seem to be absent in 
the aftermath of Beslan. The moderate changes in the legislation and laws pertaining to counter-
terrorism policy are in line with potential or accompanying security reforms. The following section 
will therefore analyze and evaluate any reforms within the security services.  
  
3.3 Security reforms 
Besides the moderate changes in counter-terrorism legislation, the Russian security services have 
experienced reforms imposed by the Kremlin to a certain degree. Peter Forster, Ph.D. at Penn State 
University states that, after a tragedy, response is “influenced by broader political agendas, past 
experiences, and local events” (Forster, 2006, p.3). As stated in the second chapter on Beslan, the 
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capability of the Russian security services to handle the precarious situation of the siege proved to be 
rather poor. This not only applies to Beslan, but also to previous ‘similar’ events like the hostage 
situation in Budennovsk in Dagestan in 1995 and the hostage situation at the Dubrovka Theatre in 
Moscow in 2002.  
 At the time of the siege in Beslan, it seemed to be widespread confusion about the 
responsibilities of the authorities that led to a chaotic response. Therefore, in the fight against 
terrorism, Putin sought to improve or, one could even argue, establish collaboration between the 
security services in the immediate aftermath of Beslan. In response to Beslan, Putin created a single 
command of joint operations to combat terrorism in the southern Federal District between the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Defense and the 
Emergency Situations Ministry (de Haas, 2005, p.11). This could be considered the first step in the 
establishment of mutual coordination. At the same time, the lack of coordination in response to 
Beslan might therefore partially explain the chaotic response of the Russian security services during 
the siege.  
 The lack of coordination or leadership at the time of the 2004 tragedy can be linked to a 
broader context of a lack of coordination and leadership within the Russian Federation as a whole, 
which is structured in terms of ‘the power vertical’. According to Monaghan (2012), the power 
vertical9 is defined as “appointing loyal figures to important positions to implement policy decisions” 
which is associated for the most with the presidency of Putin between 2000 and 2008 (Monaghan, 
2012, p1). The idea behind the power vertical is creating a strong team of leaders and accomplishing 
tasks that have strategically been set out.  
 However, the extent to which the power vertical is effective in practice in terms of 
implementing orders and instructions is questionable, especially with regard to security services, 
which is the focus of this thesis. The overall lack of coordination and authority within the Russian 
Federation might explain the problem of implementing effective counter-terrorism legislation and 
laws. Following Monaghan’s argument (2012, p.4), the effort to establish a power vertical with the 
president as the central and most authoritative figure has been lacking due to a lack of an effective 
chain of command. One can assume that a dysfunctional chain of command at the top will further 
deteriorate at lower levels with regard to the implementation and execution of orders and 
instructions. In addition, if political positions are appointed by the president through personal links 
and loyalty, it would imply that this team of leadership would function and collaborate. However, 
despite Putin’s effort to establish a strong government at the top, the mismanagement of the 
                                                             
9 Also known in Russia as the siloviki. 
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ongoing terrorist attacks seem to indicate a repetitive shortcoming in terms of overall coordination 
and leadership in Russian politics due to a dysfunctional chain of command.  
 There are several explanations for the failure of the power vertical. Following Renz, Putin 
sought to establish a government with former force-structure colleagues who lacked political 
experience (Renz, 2006, p.907-908). One must therefore question the capability of the newly 
appointed siloviki to implement and execute policy. Furthermore, according to Renz, “the rise in the 
numbers of such figures under the Putin leadership has been perceived as problematic particularly 
because of the expectation that the ‘military frame of mind’ and ‘military-style traditions’ shared by 
them would lead Russian politics into a more authoritarian direction” (Renz, 2006, p922). This 
argument is supported by Reddaway et al. (2004, p.4), who state that “the siloviki appear—as a 
loose, bureaucracy-based faction—not to have a leader or leaders, not to meet in even a semi-public 
way, and not to have any means of coordinating their goals and plans.” This showcases and suggests, 
in the broader context of Russian politics in general, the problems regarding implementing effective 
counter-terrorism policy. Post-Beslan terrorist attacks further confirm these problems. In the context 
of this research, it is evident that collaboration between the ‘siloviki’ is required to effectively 
combat terrorism, but this is apparently not the case.  
 Despite the weaknesses within the power vertical and within the Russian political system in 
general, Putin ordered the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB in the aftermath of 
Beslan which led to the signing of ‘Decree 1167’. This decree focused on “urgent measures to 
increase the efficiency of the fight against terrorism” (Soldatov & Borogan, 2005, p.3). The reforms of 
the two departments were completed in 2005 and included:  
 
 “The principle of management of counterterrorist operation in the North Caucasus; 
 The principle of management of actions of power structures involved in the resolution of 
subversive and terrorist actions in the region; 
 The principle of information gathering and analysis on the leaders of insurgents in the 
territory of the North Caucasus; 
 Tactics of special divisions in region” 
(Soldatov & Borogan, 2005, p.3). 
 
The principles refer to a new structure of coordination. The question of whether these principles 
could be considered sufficient and effective could only be answered through the execution of the 
principles. The latter principles were accompanied by several other factors which have changed in 
the MoIA and the FSB, that is, in the sphere of the information exchange about the North Caucasus 
and the system of coordination. However, Soldatov & Borogan, two directors of the non-profit 
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research organization, Agentura, which deals with security and terrorism issues, argue that these 
changes were mainly ‘cosmetic’, since, for example, sub-departments in the two departments were 
in fact only renamed (Soldatov & Borogan, 2005, p.4). Therefore, substantial changes in the two 
departments only had a small impact. Another development in the aftermath of Beslan was the 
accession of former militants to the government of Ramzan Kadyrov who had recently declared that 
Chechnya was more open to the idea of being part of the Russian Federation. 
 Despite a modest degree of security reforms, Russia still lacks a comprehensive counter-
terrorism policy that effectively combats terrorism and limits the growth of terrorism. The lack of a 
program of terrorism prevention and the use of excessive violence that Russia uses as primary means 
of fighting terrorism did not reduce terrorist attacks (Omelicheva, 2012). Shortly after 2004, in 
Nalchik10 in October 2005, the security services again failed to carry out an effective counter-
terrorism policy. I acknowledge that this attack was committed soon after Beslan, however, the 
Nalchik event has been one of the largest and most significant attacks in the North Caucasus after 
Beslan.   
 
3.3.1 The attack in Nalchik 
In October 2005, a group of an estimated 250 armed militants launched a number of attacks on the 
headquarters of the Federal Security Services, a police station and a number of other smaller 
agencies in the city of Nalchik (Dzutsev, 2012). The masterminds behind the staged attacks were inter 
alia Ilyas Gorchkhanov, Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev. The main motive of the attack was to 
overthrow the Kabardino-Balkarian government and, instead, to create an Islamic state. As a result of 
the attack, 35 members of the military and police were killed as well as 14 civilians and 92 militants. 
Besides the large number of casualties, the attack injured 129 servicemen and 66 civilians (Kavkaz-
uzel.ru, 2012).  The responsible authorities were thus unable to prevent the attack which led, again, 
to a large number of casualties and injuries. In an article by NBC news (2005), Putin said “it is bad 
that such bandit raids are still possible here, however, it’s good that this time all the law-
enforcement agencies worked in coordination, effectively and tough.” This quote, if nothing else, 
highlights the fact that authorities failed in their counter-terrorism policy at Beslan. One could 
furthermore question this statement by Putin due to the high degree of casualties, injuries and the 
lack of attack prevention.  
 In addition, in a broader sense, this attack might have been an indicator that Putin failed to 
control the tense situation in the North Caucasus in the aftermath of Beslan. Interestingly, the 
Russian security services were informed about the terrorist attack in Nalchik by a captured militant 
                                                             
10 Nalchik is the capital city of the republic Kabardino-Balkaria. The republic is bordered by Karachay-Cherkessia, North-
Ossetia, Russia and Georgia.    
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some days prior to the raid (McGregor, 2005). In addition, the majority of perpetrators were able to 
escape. Further, the coordination of Russian authorities was rather poor since every department of 
the security services started to fire at militants rather than executing a collective action plan. The 
attack in Nalchik was ill-prepared under the overarching lead of the ‘Caucasian Front’ which meant 
that the perpetrators were, in the end, under armed (Agentura.ru, 2011). Thus, in this perspective, 
the poor response of the security forces at Nalchik was neither an exception nor a desired 
improvement in the aftermath of Beslan. Yet again, the counter-terrorism policy conducted by the 
security services at Nalchik proved to be poor and highlights the lack of a learning system after 
Beslan in terms of coordination, anticipation, prevention and discriminate assessment of the 
situation (Forster, 2006, p5).  
 Therefore, the changes that were made did not seem to improve the overall ability to 
counteract terrorist attacks. However, to counterbalance, one could argue that it would be fair to 
allow Russia the necessary time that it apparently needs in regard to security reforms. In an article by 
Russia behind the Headlines (RTBH, 2014), Nikolay Silayev, senior researcher of Caucasian Studies at 
the University of Moscow states that: “in recent years, security services have stepped up pressure on 
the terrorist underground; many militants have been killed or detained.” In the aftermath of Beslan, 
Shamil Basayev (in 2006), Doka Umarov11 (in 2013) as well as Aslan Maskhadov12 (in 2005) were 
assassinated by Russian troops, thus in that regard, the latter statement is to the utmost extent true. 
In 2005, in the aftermath of Nalchik, Putin also ordered severe military measures in the North 
Caucasus region. This led to truckloads of Interior Troops being stationed in the region, who were 
particularly tasked with patrolling through the neighborhoods around Nalchik.  According to Siegel, a 
journalist from The Moscow Times (2008), the Interior Troops swept through the neighborhoods, 
which resulted in the disappearances of many young men.   
 
In sum, the Russian government did implement several new post-Beslan Federal laws and 
amendments. At the same time, given the magnitude of Beslan, the changes within the counter-
terrorism legislation have been minimal. In any case, legislation, laws and protocols are strongly 
related to the execution of practices by the responsible security services. Therefore, in terms of 
security reforms, Putin ordered several changes within the security services and military. Despite 
restructuring security departments, the nature of the power vertical under Putin suggests that it has 
not always been successful concerning getting things done in practice. The lack of a well-functioning 
power vertical evidently impedes the implementation of significant and effective counter-terrorism 
                                                             
11
 The Chechen warlord Doka Umarov was the fifth President of the republic Ichkeria in Chechnya and the mastermind of 
several significant terrorist attacks in Moscow.   
12
 Aslan Maskhadov was the leader of the Chechen independence movement as well as the third President of the republic 
Ichkeria in Chechnya. Maskhadov led the guerrilla resistance against Russian troops.  
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policy. Furthermore, the attack in Nalchik is an example that proves that the authorities are unwilling 
or unable to learn lessons from previous terrorist attacks. Despite Russia’s overall efforts to combat 
terrorism in terms of legislation and security reforms, the question remains how these efforts have 
influenced the Russian public’s perceptions in the face of reality. Hence, the following chapter will 
focus on the Russian public’s perceptions of terrorism prior to and after Beslan, as well as the role of 
the Russian media rhetoric in influencing these perceptions.   
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Chapter 4 – Counter-terrorism perceptions 
This chapter demonstrates the public’s perceptions of counter-terrorism and the rhetoric of the 
Russian media on terrorism. Section 4.1 focuses on the Russian media’s portrayal of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism policy. By analyzing the rhetoric of the Russian media, one is able to determine 
whether the Russian government perceives its counter-terrorism policy as successful and effective 
since the Russian government influences public information through the media as it largely controls 
the majority of the media. Section 4.2 aims to analyze public perception of Russia’s efforts to combat 
terrorism. Therefore, various graphs and polling data are used to analyze any changes in perceptions. 
The following section, 4.3, aims to link public perception to the actual facts and figures about 
terrorist incidents, injuries and fatalities in the timeframe between 1991 and 2014. Terrorist 
incidents prior to and after Beslan will be analyzed in order to highlight the distinction and changes.      
 
4.1 The role of Russian media 
Arguably, the media plays a significant role in the creation of a certain image and can therefore 
influence general public feeling. The media can also be considered an aspect of counter-terrorism 
policy in terms of providing crucial information to its citizens.  
 In a broader context, media rhetoric plays an interesting role in counter-terrorism policy. 
According to Simons, a member of the department of Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University, “one of 
the ‘problems’, which is by no means solely confined to the present situation in Russia, is the 
proximity of the mass media to society’s establishment” (Simons, 2006, p.3). What does this mean in 
terms of the Russian media rhetoric and counter-terrorism?  
 One idea is that Putin, through mass media rhetoric, attempts to create unification among 
the Russians as a whole. After Beslan, the leading newspaper in Russia, Izvestia, “repeatedly 
discussed the steps that should be taken to secure the triumph of good over evil. The steps included 
reforming homeland security, introducing tougher antiterrorist laws, creating a bipartisan committee 
for parliamentary investigation” (Zaytseva, 2005, p.42). In newspapers, Putin was presented and 
depicted as the ultimate defender of the nation against terrorist threats and voices of criticism were 
directed to intelligence, local officials and special forces rather than to the president. Furthermore, 
Izvestia “described Russian unity and support for President Putin as a goal that should be achieved at 
any cost. In some instances, the journalists’ arguments hardly followed any logical pattern and 
sounded like a magical incantation that was expected to bring positive results after numerous 
repetitions” (Zaytseva, 2005, p.43). In other words, post-Beslan articles in newspapers presented 
unity as the rhetorical cure for the Beslan tragedy. However, it was too simple to state that Russian 
unity was the solution to overcoming the terrorist threats and conflicts in the North Caucasus.      
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 Another way the media influences public perception of counter-terrorism is through a 
continuous news stream in the mass media stating the success of the state’s counter-terrorism 
approach and highlighting the Chechen threat. I acknowledge that newspapers, TV coverage and the 
internet in the Russian language could strengthen this argument, however, due to practical reasons, 
the focus of this thesis is on Russian mass media in English. Interestingly, the majority of rhetoric on 
counter-terrorism seems to focus on the ‘Chechen conflict’ with the ‘War on terror’ as the 
overarching concept. According to Russell, “Vladimir Putin has taken ‘every opportunity’ since 9/11 
to present Russia’s conflict with the Chechens as a component of the coalition’s overall struggle with 
Islamic insurgents” (Russell, 2007, p.90). After the murder of Boris Nemtsov, the Moscow Times 
(2015) wrote an article with the headline: “Was Nemtsov Murder 'a Job for a Chechen?” The media’s 
continuous focus on Chechens and Russian officials’ rhetoric on Muslims as extremists and the need 
to suppress these threats led to changes in Russian society.  
 According to Abdullaev & Saradzhyan, “by and large, Russian society eagerly and uncritically 
welcomed these controversial public policies, which were advanced by the government claiming that 
they would contribute to stability and security in the country” (Abdullaev & Saradzhyan, 2006, 
p.199). This was and continues to be the counter-terrorism strategy conducted by the Kremlin and 
accompanying media to secure their positions and to justify the government’s ostensible successful 
counter-terrorism approach. However, these claims can be considered cosmetic as the present 
situation has still not improved. Due to the Kremlin’s intensified control of the media, the Kremlin 
rules out critical voices in the public debate and independent media on counter-terrorism. Creating a 
positive image domestically is not sufficient, however. Therefore, the TV channel ‘Russia Today’ was 
established in 2005; financed by state budget, this channel was created to promote a more positive 
image of Russia in the West. Both approaches seem valid in the context of a more aggressive rhetoric 
by the government and media rhetoric in the aftermath of Beslan. 
 
4.2 In the eyes of the Russian public 
For this research, surveys serve as an interesting instrument to measure the perceptions of Russian 
citizens concerning the implementation of new laws that combat terrorism. Therefore, the ‘Public 
Opinion Foundation’ (FOM) conducted several surveys which were inter alia published in Russian 
Analytical Digest (2006) and asked Russian citizens whether they feel safe and whether they approve 
of the new counter-terrorism law that was implemented in 2006. Although surveys are primarily 
based on personal perceptions and influences by external factors such as the media, they 
nevertheless provide an interesting view of the general public’s perception of terrorism: 
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“Are you afraid of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack yourself?” 
        Figure 4: retrieved from the Public Opinion Foundation (2006) 
 
Figure 4 reveals the fear of Russian citizens two years after the tragedy in Beslan. Although it remains 
difficult to link it specifically to the Beslan event, one can state that a vast majority, namely 56% of 
the respondents, were afraid of becoming a victim of a terrorist act at that time. According to the 
Levada-Centre (2012-2013), 48% of the respondents had ‘fear to some extent’ while 30% of the 
respondents were very afraid of becoming a victim of a terrorist act prior to Beslan. This proves that 
the perception of Russian citizens changed significantly in a more negative way after Beslan.  
 As the following table (figure 5), published in the Russian Analytical Digest (2011), shows, the 
fear of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack prior to Beslan has not significantly changed in the 
aftermath of Beslan. 
 
‘Are you afraid that you or people close to you could fall victim to a terrorist attack?’ 
  Figure 5: retrieved from VTsIOM (2010) 
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The table starts to fluctuate after 2006. It can be concluded that the level of anxiety augmented in 
the years after Beslan. The general public perception does not seem to correspond with the new and 
amended legislation as analyzed in the previous chapter. In other words, the newly implemented 
laws and legislation with accompanying amendments have not diminished the level of anxiety 
regarding terrorist threats despite a small decline after the 2006 law. What could explain this 
augmentation after 2009? The most obvious explanation would be the two major suicide bombings 
on the subway in Moscow in March 2010 that led to 40 fatalities and 100 injuries (Johnston, 2014). In 
addition, only two days later, two suicide bombings with 14 fatalities and 37 injuries followed in 
Kizlyar in Dagestan (Johnston, 2014). Another valid explanation, following the argument of Flood et 
al. (2012, p.39), is that “an important part of Putin’s case for strong leadership was, the 
determination to protect metropolitan Russia by containing the violence within the republics of the 
North Caucasus, where the most vigorous methods of counter-terrorism would be employed to 
pacify the region.” However, Putin has not been able to withstand terrorist attacks and “a continuing 
state of low-level insurrection in large parts of North Caucasus” (Flood et al., 2012, p.39) might have 
led to distrust in the government and thus an augmentation of anxiety with regard to terrorist 
attacks.  
 Russian citizens also provided their opinion about the new counter-terrorism law that was 
implemented in 2006, represented in the figure below: 
 
‘Do you approve or disapprove of the adoption of the new counter-terrorism law?’ 
Figure 6: retrieved from Public Opinion Foundation (2006) 
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The graph above shows a large variety of responses regarding the approval or disapproval of the new 
counter-terrorism law. The graph shows that the people in Moscow and highly educated people are 
clearly in favor of the new law. In contrast, people with low education or no diploma at all are not in 
favor. Interestingly, a large group of respondents are not aware of the content of the law. This might 
be surprising given that Russia is subjected to serious and continuous terrorist activity. However, this 
could indicate an overall lack of interest, a lack of trust of the citizens in the overall efforts of the 
government concerning counter-terrorism policy or simply ignorance about this topic.      
 The following table (Levada-Centre, 2010-2011) shows the Russian public’s perception, 
between 2000 and 2011, of the Russian special services and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ ability to 
protect Russian citizens:   
 
‘Do you think that the Russian special services and Ministry of Internal Affairs will be able to 
protect Russia’s population from renewed acts of terrorism?’ 
                                 2000  
                                July  
2003  
July  
2007  
July  
2009  
August 
2010  
July  
2011  
March  
2011  
August 
Definitely yes  6  7  6  5  3  4  5  
Yes, rather than 
no  
31  22  41  40  27  25  33  
No, rather than 
yes  
37  44  33  31  42  43  40  
Definitely not  19  19  9  9  13  14  12  
Difficult to 
answer  
7  9  12  14  15  15  10  
Figure 7: retrieved from the Levada-Centre – in %. 
 
The conclusion can be made that the majority of Russian citizens feels that the Russian special 
services and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are not able to protect them from terrorism in general. 
There has been a significant change in perceptions since Beslan. Apparently, the Russian respondents 
lost confidence in the Russian special services and Ministry of Internal Affairs, as the second and third 
row of the table reveals. This could be linked, again, to an outgrowth of the promises by the Kremlin 
in terms of security reforms and new legislation (policy) designed to combat terrorism in the 
(relatively) immediate aftermath of the tragedy. Only a significantly small percentage of respondents, 
fluctuating between 3% and 7%, believed that the Russian special services and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs were sufficient enough to protect Russia from acts of terrorism before and after Beslan. As 
time progressed, the table shows that the initial feeling of the citizens prior to Beslan prevailed. This 
could be the result of distrust in the Russian government by its citizens due to the lack of a well-
functioning power vertical and its ability to combat the pressing issue of terrorism.  
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 The following table by the same leading research organization in Russia (Levada-Centre, 
2010-2011) reveals the perception of the Russian citizens in the years between 2004 and 2011 of the 
degree of truthfulness of the authorities related to Beslan:   
 
‘Do the authorities tell the truth about the events related to the Beslan hostage tragedy?’ 
Figure 8: retrieved from the Levada-Centre – in %. 
 
It can be concluded that the Russian citizens were generally suspicious about the truthfulness of the 
authorities in regard to Beslan. Over two-thirds of the respondents believed that the authorities 
were not fully honest in regard to the reports on Beslan. Hence, only a significantly small 
percentage–an average of 9%–of respondents believed that the authorities were telling the truth. In 
this case, the percentages remained rather steady which indicates that there has not been any form 
of improvement in the aftermath according to citizens. In a broader context, this might be the result 
of the misleading media rhetoric about the ostensible success concerning counter-terrorism policy by 
the government, as analyzed in section 4.1. From this perspective, the media–largely controlled by 
the Russian government–has a significant influence on public perceptions. One could argue that the 
actions and rhetoric by the government through the media resulted in the public’s overall distrust. I 
acknowledge the fact that these latter two tables only polled people up to 2011. However, these 
surveys by the Levada-Centre are the most recent surveys related to Beslan and its aftermath.  
  
4.3 Terrorist incidents and victims 1991-2014 
These surveys lead to the question of whether the public perception, as analyzed in section 4.2, is 
justified in relation to actual facts and figures on terrorism within the Russian Federation. One can 
make a distinction between terrorist incidents prior to Beslan and after Beslan. According to Robert 
Johnston, who created a statistical summary of terrorist attacks in Russia in the period between 1991 
and 2014, the bombings of apartments, hijacking of busses, hostage takings, bombings of railway 
stations, car bombings and suicide bombings were clearly visible and even intensified in the 1990s 
which resulted in a great amount of injuries as well as casualties (Johnston, 2013). These events 
                                                    2004  2005  2006  2007  2009  2010  2011  
All the truth  13  6  5  8  10  12  11  
Only a part of the truth  56  53  50  51  50  52  48  
They are withholding the 
truth  
22  28  28  24  25  19  24  
They are lying and shifting  5  7  8  6  5  5  5  
Undecided  4  6  8  11  11  12  12  
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primarily took place in the North Caucasus, in regions such as Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
Stavropol, Ingushetia and Dagestan, although Moscow also experienced several major attacks. Prior 
to the turn of the century, the worst year, in terms of casualties and injuries, was 1999 in which 378 
people were killed and 1,051 people were severely injured due to terrorist activity (Johnston, 2013). 
This was mainly due to an apartment bombing in Moscow which caused 130 casualties. Even though 
this list13 of attacks is incomplete and the latter events were just a few examples, the list provides a 
good overview of all the terrorist attacks within Russia and specifically of the North Caucasus.   
The following table (Global Terrorism Database, 2014) highlights the fact that terrorist 
activity did not diminish but rather increased, even though the incidents fluctuated throughout time:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      Figure 9: Terrorist-related incidents over time in Russia (Global Terrorism Database, 2014)   
 
The Global Terrorism Database is a specific research organization that defines terrorism in their 
codebook as follows:  “[1] the incident must be intentional [2] the incident must entail some level of 
violence or threat of violence [3] and the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub‐national actors” 
(Global Terrorism Database, 2014, p8).  Although there was a small decline in attacks during the mid-
1990s, the attacks started to increase in 1998. Interestingly, from 2000 to 2004, the number of 
incidents fell significantly. After Beslan, the attacks significantly started to increase again throughout 
the following years. Although it is difficult to measure the link between the laws in the 1990s and 
terrorist-related incidents, it could be concluded on the basis of the statistical list of terrorist attacks 
in Russia from terrorism databases that the laws that were implemented throughout the 1990s did 
not seem to reduce the terrorist attacks or terrorist activity in any case.  
                                                             
13 For more specific information on this list: http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terr-russia.html. 
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 The following table of post-Beslan terrorist attacks and accompanying injuries and fatalities 
by Johnston (2014) aims to prove that the situation remained rather hopeless and that it justifies the 
generally negative perception and feeling of Russian citizens regarding terrorism and the efforts of 
the government to combat terrorism:   
 
Year Incidents Killed Injured 
Annual rates per million population 
Fatalities 
Fatalities 
plus injuries 
2004 11 625 995 4.36 11.29 
2005 6 119 257 0.83 2.63 
2006 3 25 49 0.18 0.52 
2007 5 16 88 0.11 0.74 
2008 8 35 111 0.25 1.04 
2009 11 93 339 0.66 3.08 
2010 22 154 557 1.10 5.10 
2011 5 58 247 0.42 2.20 
2012 3 16 123 0.13 1.20 
2013 7 51 174 0.36 1.55 
2014 4 13 5 
  
          Figure 10: List of terrorist incidents in the Russian Federation (Johnston, 2014) 
 
In the aftermath of Beslan, 74 incidents, which led to approximately 580 fatalities and 1,950 injuries 
have been reported. These attacks account for Russia as well as the North Caucasus. According to the 
list of terrorist attacks within the Russian Federation, the attacks were relatively minimal in the four 
years following Beslan, despite a high degree of fatalities and injuries in 2005. The attack in Nalchik, 
as described in section 3.3.1, accounts for a large part of these statistics. However, terrorist attacks 
increased around 2009 with attacks in Nazran (Ingushetia) and Lykoshino (Tver) as the most 
significant attacks. The year 2010 stands out in regard to two major bombings in the subway in 
Moscow that resulted in 40 reported fatalities and 100 injuries. In 2011,  the most significant attack 
was the suicide bombing at Domodedovo airport in Moscow. Another notable fact from this table is 
the high degree of injuries and fatalities that accompany each incident, indicating that terrorists are 
successful in carrying out their attacks. 
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 In this regard, the changes in the counter-terrorism policy in terms of legislation, laws and 
security reforms can be considered relatively ineffective. However, I acknowledge that legislation, 
laws and their proper execution in practice do not necessarily guarantee complete safety and 
prevention. Although official statistics on terrorism prevention after Beslan are absent, this list aims 
to prove that terrorist activity remains to be a daily threat within Russia and especially in North 
Caucasian republics. This is supported by Cohen (2012, p.1), a Senior Research Fellow in Russian and 
Eurasian Studies at The Heritage Foundation, who states that: “Russia’s Northern Caucasus is turning 
into one of the most volatile, lawless regions in the world and a hotbed for international terrorist 
activity in spite of decades of Russian military operations and repeated assurances from the Russian 
government that peace has been achieved.” Thus, the future reduction of terrorist activity within the 
Russian Federation is considered to be unlikely. Ideally, further research on this specific topic could 
provide better insights into the Kremlin’s present and prospective approach to pacifying the North 
Caucasus.  
 
In sum, Russian media rhetoric on terrorism focuses primarily on the evil side of the North Caucasus 
and its ethnic groups and on the ostensible success of the Russian government in eradicating 
terrorism. This rhetoric does not seem to correspond with the reality; renewed counter-terrorism 
legislation has for the most part been a failure, indicated by the augmentation of terrorist activity 
after Beslan. Furthermore, as an overarching conclusion on the polling data, the Russian citizens 
seem more anxious of becoming victim of renewed terrorist attacks in the aftermath of Beslan. The 
2006 law reflects mixed feelings among citizens. In any case, Russian citizens are not unified 
concerning the efforts of the Russian government and its counter-terrorism legislation. In a broader 
context, the majority of Russian citizens believe that the security services and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs are unable to protect them from renewed terrorist activity. Hence, the majority of Russian 
citizens remain afraid of terrorist activity and have little trust in the newly implemented legislation, 
laws, security reforms and the truthfulness of information on tragedies provided by the authorities. 
This proves that the overall situation has not improved since Beslan. Terrorist incidents with 
significant fatalities and injuries still flourish within the Russian Federation despite Russia’s efforts to 
combat terrorism. The following and final chapter provides an overall concluding answer to the 
question of whether Beslan can actually be considered a turning point concerning counter-terrorism 
policies and public perceptions.  
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
This thesis focused on Russia’s counter-terrorism policy  and public perceptions in the aftermath of 
the 2004 tragedy in Beslan with the central research question: was Beslan  a turning point in Russia's 
approach to counter-terrorism? Based on my research and personal interpretation, I can conclude 
that the changes within Russian counter-terrorism policy have been minimal and that public 
perceptions have not improved and even deteriorated. Therefore, the event of Beslan is not to be 
considered a major turning-point in counter-terrorism policy, which is surprising considering the 
magnitude of Beslan.    
 Prior to Beslan, the 1990s were a fluctuating and unstable period marked by multiple 
bilateral wars between Russia and Chechnya which deteriorated their relationship. This fragile 
situation led to an outbreak of terrorist attacks within the Russian Federation by Chechens, Ingush, 
Dagestanis and other ethnic groups in the North Caucasus. The historically complex relationship 
between Russia and its south-periphery is ongoing and is primarily manifested in terrorist activity. 
Russia started to experience a systematic and structural terrorist threat during the 1990s and 
onwards. This has impeded successful counter-terrorism policy. Significant attacks in the 1990s and 
early 2000s by North Caucasians preceded Beslan, but it is certain that Beslan remains one of the 
prominent human tragedies in Russia’s recent history.  
 The Beslan siege led to a great number of fatalities, injuries and traumas among the 
hostages, hostage-takers, Russian security services and families. Based on the research, the Russian 
and local authorities failed to carry out effective counter-terrorism policy concerning Beslan. In spite 
of the implemented legislation, laws and security measures of the 1990s and early 2000s, the attack 
has not prevented or solved terrorist issues in a decent and effective manner. This suggests that 
counter-terrorism policy can be classified as non-effective and that the authorities have been 
ignorant of and reluctant to the threat of terrorism. Ignorance and reluctance seem to flourish within 
the Russian security services as the history of attacks and counteractions has proven. This is 
enhanced by the attack in Nalchik in 2005. Like Beslan, this attack led to a serious number of 
fatalities and injuries. The local authorities were aware of the upcoming attack, yet failed to handle 
the situation well. In a broader sense, it seems that the power vertical in Russia is unable or unwilling 
to cooperate in order to implement effective policies. This might, for a large part, explain the minimal 
and ineffective changes after Beslan.     
 Ten years after Beslan, the situation concerning terrorism within the Russian Federation 
remains hopeless. The minimal changes in counter-terrorism policy have not been sufficient to 
reduce terrorist activity. Instead, terrorist attacks still flourish within the Russian Federation and it 
seems that the authorities are unable to control the volatile situation. In 2006, a new law on counter-
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terrorism was adopted and implemented. This new law seemed to be an important step towards 
improvement but criticism of this law started to emerge soon after its implementation. The 2006 law 
basically replaced the old 1998 law, only specifically focusing on counter-terrorism and counter-
terrorism measures. Further, responsibilities among counter-terrorism services were re-distributed. 
However, according to many scholars and experts, this law failed to set out comprehensive and 
effective counter-terrorism policy. This law furthermore created possibilities of infringing on the 
basic rights of people. The law was amended in 2008, but these amendments only dealt with the 
prosecution of terrorists and the abolishment of jury trials; new cases of terrorism have since been 
decided by a panel of three judges. 
 Changes in legislation and laws pertaining to counter-terrorism have evidently been 
accompanied by security reforms. The effectiveness of legislation, laws and protocols is strongly 
dependent on practical execution by the responsible security services. It has become clear 
throughout this thesis that the Russian counter-terrorism security services continuously fail to carry 
out effective counter-terrorism policy. However, there have been moderate changes and reforms in 
this sector in the aftermath of Beslan. Vladimir Putin sought to establish better collaboration 
between the responsible security services and created joint counter-terrorism operations. However, 
as with the new legislation and laws, the security reforms were also criticized. According to experts, 
the majority of reforms are ‘cosmetic’ with old departments simply being renamed. Despite several 
important assassinations of prominent militant leaders by the Russian security services in the 
aftermath of Beslan, Russian authorities seem to be unable to learn lessons from previous terrorist 
attacks. This can be linked to an overall problem with the siloviki and the implementation of policies 
in general.     
 The Russian media is rather biased and is primarily controlled by the government; it depicts 
the North Caucasians as pure evil and the Russians as good. This strategy creates a false image of 
both parties. The Chechens and other ethnic groups within the North Caucasus feel that their 
terrorist acts are justified due to the aggressiveness of Russia within this region. Thus, improved 
relations with Russia and the south-periphery are considered to be bleak, which is a partial 
explanation for non-successful counter-terrorism policy. In general, Russian public perceptions of 
terrorism and the counteractions by the Russian government were rather positive in the immediate 
aftermath of the tragedy in Beslan. However, this perception rapidly shifted towards a generally 
negative perception. The majority of Russian citizens remain afraid of terrorist activity and have little 
trust in the implemented legislation, laws, security reforms and the authority’s information regarding 
tragedies.    
 In general, the changes in the counter-terrorism legislation, laws and security services can be 
considered minimal. These modest changes in combination with the ongoing terrorist incidents and 
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accompanying injuries and fatalities justify the generally negative perception and feeling of the 
Russian citizens towards terrorism. Thus, Russia seems to be the architect of its own misfortune in 
relation to ongoing terrorist activity and non-effective counter-terrorism policy.  
 Ideally, further research could reveal other insights or more specified research on this topic. 
One could, for instance, focus on other regions within the Russian Federation like Moscow and 
southern Russia rather than the North Caucasus. Finally, it might be interesting to further focus on 
Putin’s policy regarding the North Caucasus.   
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